I have done some of the readings for the first unit about the origins of the Cold War. I thought I would put some of the thoughts down here to clarify my thinking before I participate in the discussions.

Legacy

With regards to the legacy of the WW2, the most obvious and probably the most important legacy is the division of Europe into two 'spheres of influence'. It is this de facto division of Europe at the end of the war in Europe that underlies the subsequent issues that led the great powers from a Grand Alliance in 1945 to an armed confrontation by 1948.

Chief amongst the issues are the division of Germany and the occupation of Poland. Indeed, these two issues seemed to be the most salient in the series of events that led to the escalation of distrust which in turn resulted in the breakdown of cooperation.

Of these, the occupation of Poland by the Red Army - a consequence of its 'liberation' from German occupation - probably is more significant. It is Soviet behaviour with regards to the Polish question that first planted the seeds of doubt and distrust in the minds of the western allies.

Also, the domination of Poland by the Soviet Union, and the latter's imposition and control of the political process within Poland set the subsequent pattern for Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe. This in turn led to greater doubts and hostility on the part of the western allies.

This kind of behaviour, in turn, could be attributed to another legacy of WW2, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany that had led to so many Soviet deaths (anywhere from 25 million to 40 million), and immense damage to its industries and agriculture.

Understandably, such a horrific experience would only reinforce the Soviet Union's sense of vulnerability, which its immense but unaffordable armed strength, could not help alleviate, especially not with an American monopoly in atomic weapons.

Also understandably, the Soviet Union could hardly be expected to depend on the good will of other nations for its security, especially when we have to consider both Stalin's clinical paranoia (since the Soviet Union was totalitarian, the character of its supreme leader would play a very important role indeed) and the Soviet conception of the world through the lenses of Communism.

The western allies' unwillingness to be more accomodating of the Soviet Union, in turn, could be seen as a legacy of WW2. Or rather, of the origins of WW2. Their experience with Hitler in the 1930's was a powerful cautionary tale when it comes to accomodation of potential enemies. Accomodation then had still led to war, and it had been argued that if Hitler had been confronted earlier, the war in Europe might never have expanded and consumed so much in its terrible flames.

When confronted with Stalin, a dictator every bit as cruel as Hitler, and seemingly every bit as willing to dominate its neighbours, could the western allies have reasonably been expected to accomodate this other great dictator of the 20th Century? Surely at the back of their minds, they would ask themselves, if they do not draw a line in the sand and confront the Soviet Union, whether they would have to fight an even more catastrophic war in the future.

The Question of Inevitability

Reading the readings, I get the sense that the Cold War grew out of an absurd series of misunderstandings and poor judgements, that led each side to make moves that the other side interpreted as hostile or threatening, which in turn leads to a reaction that the other side would view as equally hostile or threatening.

The question surely must be raised as to whether the Cold War was inevitable. Or, put in another way, whether this armed confrontation that lasted for 41 years in Europe (I'm counting from 1948 to 1989), together with the huge expenditure in money, could have been avoided if one side, or both sides, had been more astute and more accomodating.

My initial assessment is this: it is difficult to see how much more accomodating the western allies could be. After all, they had virtually accepted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, together with all that this implied in terms of oppression. Not even the invasion of Hungary and its bloody aftermath could provoke the West into making a stand. Aside from a few silly forays in infiltrating agents into the other side of the Iron Curtain, the West had left the Soviet Union pretty much alone in its running of Eastern Europe.

The West's acceptance of the de facto division of Germany and the Soviet sphere of domination (it's not mere influence!) aside, any other compromise on other questions might well have endangered or damaged the interests of the West. For example, it is hardly reasonable to expect the West to accept any solution that might lead to a united Germany under the influence of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is also hardly reasonable to expect that the West would not take any measures to stablise the internal politics and economics of their own zones of occupation, considering both the potential humanitarian and political consequences.

This is another way of saying that it was unreasonable of the Soviet Union to expect the West to behave otherwise in their policies towards their portion of Germany. This is especially so considering the Soviet Union's unwillingness to participate in mechanisms to deal with such issues collectively. The Soviet Union might well have its own reasons, but this does not change the fact that its failure to participate in solving the problems collectively make it unreasonable to argue that the West should have accomodated it further, as this would effectively mean accepting Soviet interests, polices and even caprice, without question.

The question of inevitably, then, in my mind, rests more with Soviet actions than actions of the West. In this, I would say that if the Soviet Union had shown greater willingness to participate in collective mechanisms, and work with the west to solve problems collectively, the Cold War would not have resulted.

I also suspect that the Soviet Union would probably be able to participate in such collective mechanisms without endangering its own sphere of influence in Europe, as the West had shown no inclination to either subvert or wrest control of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. In other words, the Soviet Union would have been able to achieve its security aims without at the same time alienating the West, leading to an armed confrontation that lasted 41 years.

All the above points are, of course, rough sketches or thumbnails of my thoughts. I would have to re-read some of the material to flesh out my points and thinking.

I thought that as long as we're getting to know one another, I would like to just say a few words about where I am coming from. This might help to clarify some of my thoughts and my opinions as we go along this course.

I come from Singapore. It is a small island at the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula, all the way at the southern tip of the Eurasian landmass. It is at the crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Our historical experience with the Second World War had not been a pleasant one. We were rudely awakened from a cosy reliance on (and - as it turned out - illusion of) British military might to defend Malaya and Singapore, to a rapid conquest by the Japanese imperial forces. The occupation that followed was a brutal one, with many Chinese killed for suspected anti-Japanese activities, large numbers of all races deported to Thailand to work on the Death Railway, and the mass mistreatment of European internees and Prisoners of Wars.

This was the beginning of our national consciousness. The first thoughts that we could not depend on an outside power - no matter how powerful - to defend us all the time were formed. In addition, we understand military defeat and occupation not in abstract terms, but in a horrific reality. This created a sense of intense vulnerability.

This sense of vulnerability was only increased when Southeast Asia became a theatre of competition within the larger context of the Cold War. Some might dismiss Southeast Asia as a peripheral theatre, where the Cold War would not be won or loss, but for the people of Southeast Asia, this was a very real struggle, with real life implications.

Indeed, being seen as a peripheral theatre where the great powers did not have critical stakes reinforced our sense of vulnerability. We remembered too well how at the moment of crisis in 1942, we had been "abandoned" when there were higher stakes elsewhere for the great powers.

The ideological struggle during the Cold War for us was not the abstract discussion or the politicking of different forms of organising the economy and the government. It is understood in much more stark and real terms.

For example, my grandparents fled from China in 1948 as they were both members of the conservative intellectual class. One of my grand uncles did not leave early enough, and had to endure the Great Leap Forward before he was allowed to come to Southeast Asia. His stories of government incompetence and oppression, starvation and re-education were terrible.

Combined with a violent insurgency in Malaya that began in 1948, many here in Southeast Asia understood Communism not as an alternative way of organising government and economy, but as a dark and dangerous force. Some might have a dreamy illusion of its nature, but many others feared it. As a result, the counter-insurgency struggle in Malaya and anti-subversion fight in Singapore had real support, not just amongst the elites, but amongst the common people.

When Singapore became independent in 1965, we seemed to be born into a dangerous world. We were in Confrontation with Indonesia, which seemed to be inching its way towards Communism. The idea of a huge Communist country surrounding us on three sides was a sobering thought.

South Vietnam seemed to be very unstable and in danger of falling, leaving a united - and powerful - Vietnam in our eastern flank. If history was any indication, a regional power in Indochina would inevitably try to expand its influence throughout the whole area.

Recalling that the invasion of Malaya in 1941 was launched from or supported by airforces from Indochina, this would create a real national security challenge for us. This would mean that we were dependent upon the British to defend us against such a threat. Again, historical experience gave us cause to worry. Shortly later, this worry was transformed to reality when the British government announced that it would pull out its forces from Singapore in 1971.

And then, there was the problem of our livelihood. Our acrimonious seperation from Malaysia made it difficult for us to depend solely on Malaysia as our hinterland. We needed to diversify our economy. Our traditional economic role was also insufficient to generate sufficient wealth to raise the living standards of our people. Finally, our economy was dependent to a degree on the British forces stationed here - forces that might be pulled out of Singapore as Britain steadily withdraw its forces from around the world.

Singapore decided that we had to globalise our economy, attract foreign investments, and turn ourselves into a major manufacturing and shipping hub. This meant plugging ourselves into the free market economy of the First World. Our vibrant economy today testified to the soundness of that choice.

However, it would be hard to imagine that any foreign investors would be willing to invest in a small island in a region dominated by communist powers without an ability to defend itself.

It is from this perspective that I viewed the Vietnam War and the events of 1965 in Indonesia in a more positive light, despite the real human costs of those events. Despite the bloodshed in Indonesia in 1965, with or without CIA involvement, it immediately removed a potentially huge threat that surrounded us. At the same time, the opening of the Indonesian market helped us greatly in our economic development.

At the same time, the Vietnam War bought ten precious years for Singapore to build up its economy, stablise its internal politics, and develop its armed forces (from a couple of wooden boats and two infantry battalions into well equipped forces), such that by 1975, when South Vietnam finally fell, and our worst fears were realised with Cambodia becoming Communist as well, we were stable enough to withstand the impact. Those years of American involvement was absolutely crucial for us, especially when the British pulled out its forces rather abruptly in 1971. The benefits of American intervention were real.

The horror stories that came out of Cambodia between 1975-78 only confirmed our perception of Communism as a threat. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia confirmed our perception of Vietnam as an expansionist and potentially hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, which pushed us, together with other non-Communist countries, into an uneasy alliance with the Khmer Rouge in resisting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia for much of the 1980's.

It was only in the late 1980's, with the Soviet economy collapsing, that the Vietnamese threat began to subside, and finally cease. With its own economy so dependent on the Soviet economy, it became more and more difficult for it to fight in Cambodia. In contrast, the non-Communist countries in Southeast Asia were growing rapidly, building up their wealth and armed strength.

In sum, the human suffering caused by Communism is all too real from our perspective, and the intervention of great powers was crucial in defending our countries against those horrors. While intervention had sometimes come at great human cost, it also created the essential conditions for our political stability and economic prosperity. Indeed, the perceived reliability and will of great powers to intervene were crucial in boosting confidence, and reinforcing stability and prosperity in the region. 'Credibility' is not something abstract but had very real meaning and impact.

Hi, I am Philip from Singapore.

I work am an Assistant Director in the National Security Coordination Centre of the Prime Minister's Office of Singapore.

I have had an interest in armed conflict and group violence since my university days.

I look forward to learning more from the course and from my fellow course mates. :)