I thought that as long as we're getting to know one another, I would like to just say a few words about where I am coming from. This might help to clarify some of my thoughts and my opinions as we go along this course.

I come from Singapore. It is a small island at the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula, all the way at the southern tip of the Eurasian landmass. It is at the crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Our historical experience with the Second World War had not been a pleasant one. We were rudely awakened from a cosy reliance on (and - as it turned out - illusion of) British military might to defend Malaya and Singapore, to a rapid conquest by the Japanese imperial forces. The occupation that followed was a brutal one, with many Chinese killed for suspected anti-Japanese activities, large numbers of all races deported to Thailand to work on the Death Railway, and the mass mistreatment of European internees and Prisoners of Wars.

This was the beginning of our national consciousness. The first thoughts that we could not depend on an outside power - no matter how powerful - to defend us all the time were formed. In addition, we understand military defeat and occupation not in abstract terms, but in a horrific reality. This created a sense of intense vulnerability.

This sense of vulnerability was only increased when Southeast Asia became a theatre of competition within the larger context of the Cold War. Some might dismiss Southeast Asia as a peripheral theatre, where the Cold War would not be won or loss, but for the people of Southeast Asia, this was a very real struggle, with real life implications.

Indeed, being seen as a peripheral theatre where the great powers did not have critical stakes reinforced our sense of vulnerability. We remembered too well how at the moment of crisis in 1942, we had been "abandoned" when there were higher stakes elsewhere for the great powers.

The ideological struggle during the Cold War for us was not the abstract discussion or the politicking of different forms of organising the economy and the government. It is understood in much more stark and real terms.

For example, my grandparents fled from China in 1948 as they were both members of the conservative intellectual class. One of my grand uncles did not leave early enough, and had to endure the Great Leap Forward before he was allowed to come to Southeast Asia. His stories of government incompetence and oppression, starvation and re-education were terrible.

Combined with a violent insurgency in Malaya that began in 1948, many here in Southeast Asia understood Communism not as an alternative way of organising government and economy, but as a dark and dangerous force. Some might have a dreamy illusion of its nature, but many others feared it. As a result, the counter-insurgency struggle in Malaya and anti-subversion fight in Singapore had real support, not just amongst the elites, but amongst the common people.

When Singapore became independent in 1965, we seemed to be born into a dangerous world. We were in Confrontation with Indonesia, which seemed to be inching its way towards Communism. The idea of a huge Communist country surrounding us on three sides was a sobering thought.

South Vietnam seemed to be very unstable and in danger of falling, leaving a united - and powerful - Vietnam in our eastern flank. If history was any indication, a regional power in Indochina would inevitably try to expand its influence throughout the whole area.

Recalling that the invasion of Malaya in 1941 was launched from or supported by airforces from Indochina, this would create a real national security challenge for us. This would mean that we were dependent upon the British to defend us against such a threat. Again, historical experience gave us cause to worry. Shortly later, this worry was transformed to reality when the British government announced that it would pull out its forces from Singapore in 1971.

And then, there was the problem of our livelihood. Our acrimonious seperation from Malaysia made it difficult for us to depend solely on Malaysia as our hinterland. We needed to diversify our economy. Our traditional economic role was also insufficient to generate sufficient wealth to raise the living standards of our people. Finally, our economy was dependent to a degree on the British forces stationed here - forces that might be pulled out of Singapore as Britain steadily withdraw its forces from around the world.

Singapore decided that we had to globalise our economy, attract foreign investments, and turn ourselves into a major manufacturing and shipping hub. This meant plugging ourselves into the free market economy of the First World. Our vibrant economy today testified to the soundness of that choice.

However, it would be hard to imagine that any foreign investors would be willing to invest in a small island in a region dominated by communist powers without an ability to defend itself.

It is from this perspective that I viewed the Vietnam War and the events of 1965 in Indonesia in a more positive light, despite the real human costs of those events. Despite the bloodshed in Indonesia in 1965, with or without CIA involvement, it immediately removed a potentially huge threat that surrounded us. At the same time, the opening of the Indonesian market helped us greatly in our economic development.

At the same time, the Vietnam War bought ten precious years for Singapore to build up its economy, stablise its internal politics, and develop its armed forces (from a couple of wooden boats and two infantry battalions into well equipped forces), such that by 1975, when South Vietnam finally fell, and our worst fears were realised with Cambodia becoming Communist as well, we were stable enough to withstand the impact. Those years of American involvement was absolutely crucial for us, especially when the British pulled out its forces rather abruptly in 1971. The benefits of American intervention were real.

The horror stories that came out of Cambodia between 1975-78 only confirmed our perception of Communism as a threat. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia confirmed our perception of Vietnam as an expansionist and potentially hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, which pushed us, together with other non-Communist countries, into an uneasy alliance with the Khmer Rouge in resisting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia for much of the 1980's.

It was only in the late 1980's, with the Soviet economy collapsing, that the Vietnamese threat began to subside, and finally cease. With its own economy so dependent on the Soviet economy, it became more and more difficult for it to fight in Cambodia. In contrast, the non-Communist countries in Southeast Asia were growing rapidly, building up their wealth and armed strength.

In sum, the human suffering caused by Communism is all too real from our perspective, and the intervention of great powers was crucial in defending our countries against those horrors. While intervention had sometimes come at great human cost, it also created the essential conditions for our political stability and economic prosperity. Indeed, the perceived reliability and will of great powers to intervene were crucial in boosting confidence, and reinforcing stability and prosperity in the region. 'Credibility' is not something abstract but had very real meaning and impact.